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I am not a writer, scholar, lawyer, or professor. I'm an artist. What
you find here are my personal thoughts and feelings about creative and
intellectual property. If it helps me clarify any of my own thoughts and
conceptions, then perhaps it is "worth" the time I "spend" writing this.
If it helps you see things.from a different perspective, then perhaps it is
"worth" your time in reading this. If I've done a really "good job," it
might be "worth" a bit more than anyone might have imagined. In that
case, ownership becomes an issue.
It strikes me that the areas of law devoted to protecting intellectual
property confront a strange dilemma. On the one hand, protection stim-
ulates individual creative productivity. On the other hand, it can stifle
the advances of a collective effort in a specific arena of human interest, or
the "additive" refinements of an individual breaking new ground on an
existing body of work.
Being a visual artist, I see much in the nature of the laws sadly lack-
ing in any real understanding of the creative process. Now, as science
and technology grow ever more "artistic," and the financial stakes in-
volved have been raised to "interesting" levels, it would be nice to see
some deeply intrinsic changes in the law's view of the creative person.
Since I am not a lawyer, I'd like to share a little about the creative pro-
cess from my own point of view. I'm an all-over-the-road type, so fasten
your seat belt, and hang on for the ride.
Creative people are prisoners. That is to say that they get "cap-
tured," and the only way out is to beat a path away from the point of
captivity. If my attention is "capturedt" it is impossible to simply get
away. The bars are not physical. They are produced by the intellectual,
the emotional, or, more usually, a combination of the two. But, they are
as functional as any jail cell ever constructed in the material world. This
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experience of being captive seems to be tied to some personal sense of
perfection or imperfection.
In the case of perfection, I am given to feeling "connected," i.e., not
alone. This almost always inspires me to reach out, through my work, in
an attempt to create more perfection and share this wonderful feeling.
This is more a process of re-interpretation in the case of those who, for
some inexplicable reason, are unable to perceive perfection in that which
I have encountered. Great things make me feel optimistic about the pos-
sibility of creating great things. But this is not an act of mere reproduc-
tion. Most creative people find the act of reproduction boring. I
certainly do.
In the case of imperfection, frustration leads me to feel either "dis-
connected," i.e., lonely, or just plain disappointed. In this case, I am
driven to make corrections, so that I may feel good again. It makes no
difference whether the imperfect is the product of another person's ef-
forts, or of natural occurrence. It demands to be changed, or refined, so
that I can feel good again.
Feeling good again can be its own reward. It is often described by
many creative people as an "orgasm" of solution. This is an experience
with which I am intimately familiar. If you have ever struggled to under-
stand some concept or to solve a problem, perhaps you know that joyous
moment when you "get it." You have to expand that by cubic propor-
tions when you "get" something that wasn't there before.
Something new can also come out of just setting about creative work
without having any plan or destination in mind. I just simply begin to
work, and something will transpire that is not just another re-creation of
something I've done before. When this happens, I sometimes have to
step back and figure out just exactly what it is that I have made. It's the
very image of the researcher in the laboratory who, through trial and
error, stumbles upon a discovery.
Many times, though, an idea will come out of nowhere. It strikes
like a bolt of lightning in the night. A blinding flash that leaves an after-
image in my head. These are often the most brilliant creations. The
trick is to "get it" quickly, because it fades fast. You could say I have
been captured by it, and it has been captured by me. And, at that point,
it is mine. But do I own it?
When I hear the words, intellectual property, they make me think of
the things inside me, the things I know, either in thought, emotion, or
some combination. If I know them, they are mine. But that is more to
say that I possess them, not so much that I own them. For if it is some-
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thing I have learned, it might not in fact be my property to do with what
I wish. I think the best example is a poem. Who owns a poem?
I have a book of poems. I own the individual book which contains
the poems. I have possession of it, and I may sell it as a self-contained
object. The ownership is of the physical object, which grants me access
to the poems printed in the book. If I do more than simply read, and
actually consume one of the poems, I possess the poem.
But, in my mind, the poem now belongs to two people, to the poet
and to me. A strange thing is taking place here. I do not own half the
poem. The poem exists twice. Its value has been doubled. Equally, if a
third person consumes the poem, its value has been tripled.
The artist, Caroline Sykora, supports this by pointing out that the
construction of the words is an organization which helps me to identify
and understand something which already exists inside me. The poem is
a method-ritual that helps me bring into view those things with which
the poem is concerned. Where the book grants me access to the poem,
the poem grants me access to myself and limited access to the poet. This
is where the sense of connectedness occurs. I know that I am not alone,
because someone else thinks and feels the same way I do, or very simi-
larly. If you see the poem as an intellectual tool, I now own the tool.
If the poet sold the entire copyright in the poem, you might think
that the poem now belongs to the publisher. The publisher may in fact
own all the "rights" in the work of poetry, but the publisher does not
"own" the poem. I have not just read, but consumed the poem so inti-
mately that it is part of me. I no longer need the book to enjoy that
poem. I have possession that cannot be taken away from te, and for
which I need pay no further.
But what if I compose my own poem, a unique creation, not previ-
ously existing in any form anywhere? Suppose it is an organization of
words which addresses the relationship between desire and destruction.
Does this mean I own it more?
My answer is that it means I own something in addition to the
poem, and quite separate from it-the copyright. This has nothing to do
with ownership of the poem itself. Suppose I forget the poem, and all
records of it are destroyed, except for the record that documents my
ownership of the rights to it. I no longer own the poem in the sense
discussed previously. I own the rights to something which no longer
exists.
This is the interesting point where conceptual art, trompe l'oeil and
expression often converge. Each addresses the shifting paradigm, the
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ever evolving reality in which we believe, and it is impossible not to make
some commentary on mythology for this. is the thrust of fine art (and
law), to scare away the crow-documents that support the false.
I must confess that I hate my voice, and, I have no acting ability.
Also I am dyslexic. All of this is true. Because of my dyslexia, I get
people to read to me. The greatness of this particular poem I hypotheti-
cally wrote rests not in its written form, but in its spoken form. I want to
hear it, not as a thought in my head, but as an auditory sensation. So I
have someone recite the poem, with powerful interpretation, into a cas-
sette recorder. The performer is gifted with a unique tonality and has a
talent for interpretation. We make the recording, and we make a copy
for the performer. Who owns what?
There has been something "creative" added to my poem, so now
there are more rights. The law so far has no problem with all this. A few
questions asked, and the answer is simple. But the poem is in hot de-
mand, and the audience is not happy with anything less than a "live"
performance. Only, the performer thinks the poem is incomplete, and
adds third and fourth verses. The audience likes the additions very
much, and the new version is in even greater demand.
There is no doubt that I deserve a stake in all the value that has been
created. The question is, is it fair of me to deprive the audience of what
has been, in the public's view, improved upon?
As a creative person, I feel I should have absolute control over my
creations. If it were one of my drawings and another artist drew onto it
without my consent, I'd go crazy! But that involves physical property.
If another vtist drew on top of a print of my drawing, adding to the
intellectual property, I could accept that as a creative act. The original
would remain, after all, unaltered.
This is difficult for me. I might not like the additional verses, or the
additional drawing, but I could accept the addition as valid where my
creative contribution was significant under three conditions:
1. My original work must be acknowledged.
2. The new work must be properly identified as an additive work.
3. I must receive my fair share of the proceeds.
I deeply relate to other artists who feel that their absolute right over
their work should extend to protect them from unwilling collaboration.
There is nothing quite so sad as a work which is "perfect" that gets
cheapened by untalented interpretation of or addition to it. It makes me
sick just thinking about it. But creative freedom must allow just that. I




More important to this exploration, though, is what entitlement
would da Vinci have in the proceeds? How much of the "new" creation
belongs to "Leo-baby," and how much to "Marcello-darling." In this
particular case the two works were created centuries apart. But what if
they had originated days apart?
The problem in these situations is that both artists usually are con-
vinced their individual contribution is more important. If a legal claim
ensues, the court has a tough decision to make. But does anyone consult
with any other artists in this matter, or museum curators, critics, or col-
lectors? Who would be the experts in such a matter? The decision is
often up to a judge whose visual development extends only to the 19th
century hunting prints which decorate his chambers.
These are difficult issues to be sure. Were I in the position that my
work was taken further, and a dispute arose, I would want a jury of my
peers. Wouldn't it make some sense to designate special interest jurors?
Why have an art critic sitting in judgment over a case involving pick-up
trucks, said to explode on impact due to negligent design, while in the
next court room there is a mechanical engineer hearing arguments about
visual creations? Peers should mean peers.
There must be many situations that occur in the art world that re-
ally confuse the legal system. I know that a great many cases concerning
works of art really confuse me. When Andy Warhol cut a small section
of a photograph of flowers from a magazine, rotated it, and made it his
own, he was sued for copyright violation.2 I don't know if the case was
settled in or out of court, but I do know that Andy paid a settlement. I
remember thinking that he must have had a bad lawyer, for the new
work bore so little relationship to the source work. I actually got angry
at the artist who brought the suit. But that didn't bring me to comfort.
The thought hung in the hallway of my head like a puzzle painting out of
place. Each time I passed it, on the way to another thought, it revealed
another piece. Finally, while passing slowly by, I stopped to consider it
with a bit more care. It just sort of fell into place.
Since the source material was an "ingredient," the supplier should
be paid. Andy surely paid for the ink, the screens, the canvas, and the
stretchers. Why shouldn't he pay for the source image as well, since it
was produced by someone, somewhere, with a degree of work involved?
Now, how should we approach the problem of quantification?
I could look at the value of the new work, and working from that
formulate a percentage contribution of the source work to the entire new
work. But this would encourage frivolous suits against any artist whose
1993]
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work came to be highly valued. Instead, why not view the source mate-
rial as a material, and base its value on a percentage of the going rate for
work by the source material artist? If the source artist were a photogra-
pher, whose work was selling for $2000 per work, and the selecting artist
used one quarter of one photograph, why not make the payment $500?
Or, it could be more generous, say, the full $2000.
But let's remember that the source Warhol used was not an original
photograph. It was a representation of the photograph, printed in a mag-
azine. If Warhol had selected the image for his magazine, Interview,
what would he have paid for its publication? Perhaps a few hundred
dollars. And if the magazine was to crop the image down in size, he
would still have had to pay the same amount. This would support the
notion of paying for the use of the entire work, even if only one quarter
was used. It also supports the idea that payment should be based on the
going rate for the source artist, because the photographer is not selling
the work, rather a license for use. The license for use is not closely re-
lated to the price of the magazine, or the total price of all copies of that
issue sold that month. So why should the source artist expect a bonanza
when the work plays a minor role in the creation of a new work by an-
other artist?
There is quite a different issue of damages, which I do not wish to
explore in any depth on this occasion, except to say that they played no
role in this case. If anything, the photographer damaged himself in my
view. By bringing suit, he shed an unflattering light upon himself, as an
artist whose own work was of minor import. I do not recall his name,
and none of the artists, photographing artists included, can remember his
name or his work (although some remembered "that ------ "). Were I
a curator, the suit would have inspired me to view his other works. If
they were, in fact, any good, I am sure we would all have his name close
to hand. Obviously, there was damage to his reputation. This is not to
say that his work is, in fact, poor. Nor is it to say that he is, in fact,
an "- - -," but the suspicion and the opinion are held against him
by some, and that forms part of his reputation.
Personally, I thought that the photographer in the Warhol "Flow-
ers" case was entitled to $13.47, which is just my estimation of the photo-
graph's contribution to the new work. The selection by Warhol was not
based on any major element of the photograph, and what struck Warhol
as interesting was not the specific focus of the photographer. Further, I
thought the photographer's claim to composition was meritless. The
flowers were composed by nature, not the photographer, and Warhol
changed that composition by turning one of the flowers.
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If any artist were to cut out a piece of some magazine representation
of my work and use it as part of some other composition, I cannot imag-
ine myself being concerned, unless the part used was of central impor-
tance to the new work (in which case I'd want to know about the artist
who exercised such good taste). Of course if I see this paragraph in your
next essay, and you do not give me credit for having written it, you'll be
hearing from my lawyers!
The last line is just a joke of course. If you included the last para-
graph in one of your essays, unaltered and as your own, you would be
guilty of plagiarism. But would I be justly entitled to royalties in your
essay, especially if the other 1450 words were entirely of your own selec-
tion and arrangement? What if you just took the ideas of my Essay and
restated them in your "own" words? You certainly do not "own" the
individual words, and I do not "own" the general opinions I have
formed. Once you have consumed my opinions, you may "hold" them
yourself-they may become "your" opinions. At any rate, this seems to
point out the various differences between creative disciplinary activities.
Nothing gets me quite so angry as seeing a visual artist whose style
is copied and, in effect, stolen. And it bewilders me that people can get
away with it. It happens most often with artists who gain a certain de-
gree of recognition, gained in large part by their style. All the pop artists
suffered this, and it is an entirely different situation than using a small
part of some other artist's work. In fact, this is a very big problem, for
there are not even two distinct common words for what I mean by style,
and what I mean by "STYLE." It is no wonder non-artists have diffi-
culty with the concepts.
The STYLE of Roy Lichtenstein is in the style of comic books.3
The former is a "distinctive style," while the latter is a general one. Lots
of other artists of the Pop scene worked in the latter, though only a few
created a distinctive style. Musicians call it a "sound," as opposed to a
"style." The Beatles and the Stones both played in the style of rock 'n'
roll, but each had their individual "sound," man. (Just a little joke to
acknowledge the creative input of the producers and sound engineers,
some of whom receive royalties in recognition of their creative
contributions.)
Most accountants would not be able to tell the difference between a
blown up comic strip and a Roy Lichtenstein, and most artists wouldn't
know the difference between an expense and a capital investment. But
when I see an advertisement done in the STYLE of Lichtenstein, I know
it is done in his STYLE, not the style of a comic strip. The accountant
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might award the artist no damages or royalties, owing to a lack of visual
sensitivity. I would give Lichtenstein more than royalties. I would
award him every last cent of revenue produced by such imitations, and
compensation for other damages as well, for I think they exist expan-
sively. His STYLE was employed to sell other products that aroused
interest through the exploitation of that STYLE. It is his and his alone.
If such imitations were prohibited, he would be able to ensure that the
revenues received from each use were in proper scale. Where a
"schlock" artist cheats Lichtenstein is not just in the fee he does not pay
to use the image. The "schlock" sells the copyright cheaply, and usually
never looks back for royalties. Lichtenstein is thus victimized twice.
I am told that Newsweek magazine recently published an image and,
somewhere inside, gave credit to Barbara Kruger, the artist whose
STYLE it used.4 This is a step in the right direction, and I compliment
Newsweek on their gesture. Kruger gets copied left, right, and center. I
cringe each time I see her STYLE in magazines and newspapers, on tele-
vision, billboards, and T-shirts. I think it should be her right to allow
such uses if she so chooses, for free or for fee, at her discretion. I do not
think that others have the right to steal something that is hers. I've
talked with some graphic artists who contend that the style existed al-
ready, and that she just made it recognizable. I believe this is totally
unsupportable rubbish!
There are major elements in Kruger's STYLE that, I agree, did exist
previously, as styles. But what she does in her combinations and compo-
sitions is an entirely unique creation, deserving appreciation and credit-
in the form of a copyright! She created something that did not exist
before, and that creation has a value of which she is being unfairly de-
prived. And all because, I believe, those who judge such things are visu-
ally insensitive. They simply cannot see the difference between style and
STYLE.
Before I appear too condemnatory, I would not have you believe
this is a judgment that the person with such problems is a failure. It is
not to say that someone is just ignorant, lazy, or uncultured. As I said,
I'm dyslexic. I can barely read, and then only a short length of text at a
snail's pace for a short period of time. That does not make me stupid, as
they believed me to be in school. It means I have no talent or sensitivity
for consuming literature. I am therefore'ill-equipped to sit in judgment
of literary matters.
In fact, if you were to reprint my entire Essay under your own
name, I most likely would never know about it unless someone told me.
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Even though it might be brought up in discussion within the circles I
travel, its content would be related to me by way of synopsis. I'd proba-
bly feel good that someone shared my opinions, not realizing just how
much more than just my opinions you truly "shared."
Recognition of STYLE is not only a matter of sensitivity. Interest,
ability, and exposure must be followed by some form of serious study.
Consider Alfred Frankenstein, an art historian, who set out to catalogue
the work of William Michael Harnett, a 19th century American painter
who worked in the style of trompe l'oeil (tromp loy). Harnett seemed to
have painted a great number of images of currency, presented flat, as if
pasted to the canvas or a board. Except, through study, Frankenstein
discovered that there were very few images actually painted by Harnett,
perhaps four in existence. There were, however, a large number of paint-
ers of the period who shared his interest.
Each had his own STYLE, subtly different from each other, and
Frankenstein was able to identify each of them. Even to the talented
and trained eye, the paintings appeared to be all Harnett's, because they
were in the same style. Yet, each artist had his own STYLE, more pro-
nounced with the greater degree of creativity. Only through scholarship
did Frankenstein come to see the difference.
In his book, After the Hunt,5 which preserves his intriguing search,
Frankenstein so successfully chronicles his hunt, that others can under-
stand how one comes to discern STYLE. Frankenstein has passed, but
Bruce Chambers and Edward Nygren, both experts on the subject of
19th century American trompe l'oeil money painters, have dedicated
themselves to its study. I could no more pass off a John Haberle in place
of a Victor DuBreuil6 to either of them than I could give you coffee in
place of tea.
You see, STYLE is not just a matter of one thing. It is not just
brush-work, material, subject matter, scale, intent, composition, context,
texturality, or statement. It is the unique "flavor" of them all. The
paintings all looked the same, even to art people of the day, in large part
due to their subject matter, paper money (itself a work of art). Presented
in the style of the period, often depicting the same bills, the paintings
were easily confused. Not least significant was that the artists were fasci-
nated by the philosophic investigation of abstract representations and the
confusion that exists between the image and the thing itself.
But artists have painted money for centuries. The Pop period
brought us many works by almost all artists working in that style. Yet, it
would be improbable that someone with an interest in art would confuse
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19th century trompe l'oeil and 20th century Pop, even though the subject
matter is basically the same.
This reminds me of a recent situation, known to most as the "string
of puppies" case, 7 involving a sculptor and a photographer. The photog-
rapher, on commission, captured an image of a woman with seven pup-
pies in her arms. The sculptor responded to the two-dimensional image
in a three-dimensional ceramic work. Legal suits followed, and the judg-
ments so far are for the plaintiff. Wrong!
Please note that I did not say that the sculptor "translated" the im-
age. What was an image in two dimensions became something quite new
when the sculptor was inspired by the image. The court's dependence on
visual recognition and comparable composition never took into account
the differences in style and subject matter. Even more troubling is the
lack of understanding of visual speech. The two works expressed such
extremely different statements that, in my mind, visual literacy becomes
the focus. More than most, this case proves that the system of justice has
no real understanding of art. If you try to boil it all down to one or two
technical points, you miss what art is in the first place.
John Koegel, the attorney representing the sculptor, points out that
artists "implant subtle communication which requires a deeper investiga-
tion to receive. A glance at mere surface is no more effective than judg-
ing a book by its cover." Further, his frustration at courts' refusal to
base their decisions on anything beyond the very obvious (an infringe-
ment has occurred as a matter of law) is shared by almost every visual.
arts person who has ever had occasion to go to court. This is especially
true when Fine Art, whose interests pertain to truth and beauty, ad-
dresses commercial art, whose interests lie much more in the collection
and protection of cash. Though the two employ the same techniques and
materials, they appear to me as similar as cats and donkeys. (To you the
similarity may be closer, such as that between cats and dogs, but I still
couldn't sell you a puppy and make you believe it was a kitten. Unless,
of course, you were an imbecile. But, law is supposed to be based on the
standard of a reasonable person, not a moron in a hurry.)
Nevertheless, I have friends with no interest in visual art, and I
know firsthand that they cannot tell the difference between Fine Art and
commercial art. Their interpretive skills just are not aligned in any man-
ner to perceive it. Again, I do not say this in a negative fashion, but
merely as a statement of neutral fact-they have no "taste" in this area.
Taste is a word I hate, because it has come to carry connotations of
negative judgment based on socioeconomic enculturation. I use it here in
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its original connotation. I know what it meant .... 11 I once compli-
mented a hostess on a truly great steak, with much enthusiasm and vol-
ume. Everyone broke out laughing. Seeing my puzzlement, my date
leaned over to whisper in my ear, "It's lamb, Boggs." I looked at her,
looked down at the meat, and then up to the eyes of the guests, who, now
realizing it was not an intended joke, were choking to stifle their laugh-
ter. I burst into laughter, not tears, and the table exploded with me. Not
at me, but with me.
I don't feel defensive about my shortcomings in such instances.
Why should a judge, juror, or lawyer, when faced with matters for which
they similarly lack "taste"? I'd be the first to remove myself from a panel
faced with the task of deciding "who owns this steak." It might very
well be lamb.
Expert witnesses, I hear you say. Well, yes, this is a very important
part of our legal system; one which works very well up to a point. Unfor-
tunately, most people outside the world of art view it with a degree of
suspicion. Art has an elitist air about it, and it is only human nature to
feel condescended to when the issues begin to get confusing. The frustra-
tion of an expert witness, struggling to translate into a few minutes of
words that which is visual and has taken years to understand, too often is
taken as snootiness. The judge and juror are asked to do the impossible,
and they should not be blamed for misinterpreting all that is presented,
work of art as well as testimony.
You might know that I make drawings, paintings and prints of
money. I have been arrested twice for counterfeiting, once in England in
1986, and again in Australia in 1989. On the first occasion, I did every-
thing I possibly could to explain my work to the Bank of England and to
Scotland Yard. I really felt I was speaking a different language, and to
some degree, I was. I was talking a mixture of art and common sense. I
thought the "art-speak" alone would only serve to convince them I was
making fun of them with language they didn't understand. My miscalcu-
lation was that they couldn't understand common sense either. The rea-
son, I believe, is that they were making visual judgments based on no
proper foundation. What to me seemed a specific series of reference
points, based on both visual and conceptual experience, to them was but
one simple concept-visual resemblance.
During the year while waiting for trial, I became friendly with the
detective-inspector who led the arrest team. He had in fact come to un-
derstand that I was neither a counterfeiter nor a threat to the currency,
but he still could not see the difference as far as my drawings and conduct
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were concerned. I would go in to see him on official business and show
him some items I had purchased that week with my drawings of money.
(Did I mention that is what I do with the drawings, spend them?) He
would squint, as a child who believes that what he cannot see does not
exist, and say, "Don't show me thatl For Christ's sake, I don't want to
have to arrest you again."
In truth, he really didn't want to. But he felt he would have to,
because he could not make any distinction between my activities--mak-
ing images of money on paper and then "spending" them-and those of a
counterfeiter. I admit it sounds on the face of it... well, ... the same.
But that's just it. 'It "sounds" the same when you translate the two into
brief written or spoken descriptions. If you are ill-equipped to see the
difference, your description of both activities will be the same. Equally, if
you approach both activities with the same description already formed in
verbal conception in your head, you are disadvantaged in your attempt to
see the difference.
Go back for a moment to the woman with the armful of puppies, the
photographer, and the sculptor. Consider the following:
There is a woman with long, straight, brown hair. She is fair and at-
tractive, and smiling with the joy of puppies. Her aviator glasses glint
with the late afternoon summer sun, and her arms are held wide as she
embraces seven adorable little puppies. She somewhat awkwardly
clutches them to her chest as they wiggle in the suspended position
that heightens their own sense of stability and gravity. Each little
puppy's face hints at personality: two seem to be enjoying this feeling,
two seem afraid, two are confused, and the other is just plain annoyed
at the whole affair. The woman's face reveals the difficulty of her task,
that of holding all seven puppies while trying to look into the camera,
which makes it impossible to see what she should do next with her
arms to contain the bunch. Her beige cotton shirt has been pulled off
center by all this motion and friction.
Is this a violation of the photographer's copyright? It is a descrip-
tion of the image and composition. Is it an interpretation of the image,
or a translation? Is thisan acceptable use of image because words are a
different discipline? Sculpture is a different discipline from photography.






Now, as you can see, I have placed the copyright information at the
bottom, complete with my signature. I can claim copyright, and I would
win in court if you published the drawing on a post-card. But that
doesn't give me the copyright in a circle, only this specific drawing of a
circle. If you removed my information and signature, I'd have a very
tough time proving it was mine. But I could, if you produced the image
by means of some high fidelity technique, for there are edges to this
drawing that can be identified with the aid of a magnifying glass. What
is more important here is your motive. Are you saying something
through your production, or are you just exploiting through
reproduction?
Lichtenstein, in some of his later works, made many quotations of
Picasso's work. Some of Lichtenstein's works are paintings of Picasso's
paintings. Yet, if you look at them, that is clearly what they are. The
STYLE is obvious, visually, because the difference between their
STYLES is vast. At the other extreme is an artist like Elaine Sturtevant,9
whose work was to depict another's painting and STYLE so precisely
that you wouldn't recognize a difference if you didn't know any better.
This STYLE isn't something you just see with your eyes. You have to
study it on an intellectual or conceptual level. To call her a mere copyist
is to miss her STYLE completely, and all the rich and rewarding commu-
nication it yields.
I would want points if I were betting on a copyright case filed by the
Picasso estate against Lichtenstein. I would want a very healthy spread.
But there's no way I'd gamble on the outcome of a case against Sturte-
vant. My faith in my fellow man is tempered by the knowledge of my
own grappling with these differences. Where and how I came to see and
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understand the dynamic tension that makes Sturtevant's works so power-
ful was lost in.the journey of my curiosity. Hers is a case where the
difference is dependent upon all things other than visual resemblance.
And I'd roll my eyes into my head, the victim of some mental implosion,
if I ever had to explain this to the police.
"Have you ever heard of Arthur Danto?" 10 I can hear myself saying
to the police. Inside I would know I finally made my way to hell: an
eternity of identifying something by what it isn't, in some vain hope that
I might describe everything in existence, save for the remaining thing
itself. I'd keep reaching points of expectation, that any moment now,
that spark in the police officer's eye would glimmer into the bright light
of understanding, only to see it as an after-image of something that was
there, I could swear, just a split second ago.
Maybe I would be surprised. The police officer might turn to me
and begin to explain his experiences on the combat-course of the firing
range. While training for quick, correct responses to high stress situa-
tions, an intimate understanding of instinct and intuition, as it relates to
seeing, might occur. He might, for example, begin to explain the rapid
recognition process whereby he knows which target is a bad guy based on
some identification of an abstract part of the image, before either full
visual recognition or mental cognition have been fully processed. He
might even go on to describe how he did the same thing, in reverse, in the
process of identifying a good guy, through the absence of the same piece
of abstracted visual information.
This sort of happened once. A city police officer once tried to ex-
plain to me how he had saved himself from a new and unwanted orifice.
He dropped to the ground out of reflex response, at which time a bullet
whistled by, followed by a flash of yellow light, and then, a blast. His
recall of the experience was a result of tachy-psychia, but he is sure he
fell to the ground out of reflex. He had no conscious awareness of any-
thing out of place. He summed it up this way, "I guess I knew what it
was, before I knew what it was."
This was a veteran police officer, and his years of experience had
brought to him powers of recognition in a particular area that we civil-
ians rarely possess. The powers need not be visual. Another police of-
ficer, a state trooper, wrote of an experience where, by the letter of the
law, he shot a man illegally. Having stopped a suspicious hitchhiker, he
made the mistake of turning his back on the man, standing behind the
car, to return to his radio. The trooper pulled his gun, turned, and fired
a single fatal shot. He was instantly frozen in fear that he may have just
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killed an innocent man, but he somehow knew the hitchhiker had a Colt
.45 Government Model pistol. It was almost as if the trooper had a clair-
voyant vision. Sure enough, he found the cocked pistol he had seen in his
mind while his back was turned. What had happened, which he cared
not to enter into his official report, was that the sound of the chambering
of a cartridge, one he had heard a zillion times, was proof positive recog-
nition for his subconscious mind to expedite protective action.
I'd bet on his chances, were the case ever to come to court. In this
case, expert witnesses could shed a great deal of light on such things, and
that is good and great and right. And, the existence of the hitchhiker's
pistol, brought into a state of readiness for immediate use in a situation
where there could be no other logical conclusion than that the trooper
was about to be the victim of grave bodily harm or death, would vindi-
cate his actions. Yet, in his writing, the trooper states his belief that he
broke the letter of the law for the simple reason that he never saw the
hitchhiker's gun. He believes that conscious physical visual recognition
is a requirement according to the letter of the law. Though he is willing
to share his recognitive experience for the benefit of other peacekeepers,
and he knows he was in the right "spiritually," he finds himself in error
based on a very narrow band of sensory perception: he did not see the
gun.
I offer these stories to illustrate that recognition of creative property
has to be approached in a manner appropriate to the discipline. The
simplistic view that exists in visual copyright decisions leads me to sus-
pect that other areas are equally bound in precedents ill-equipped to
fairly address an ever more complicated world.
At this time, I am suffering from all of this, though it is not copy-
right, exactly, that is at issue in my case. I have been identified as a
"counterfeiter" yet again. This time, by the United States Secret Service,
its General Counsel, and the U.S. Attorney in Pittsburgh. Though I
have not yet been arrested, my live-work studio and my office at Carnegie
Mellon University have been ransacked. Nearly 1300 items were seized
as contraband, and I just received a certified letter that presents itself as
an immediate threat of arrest.
The whole thing seems quite insane to me, and my frustration is at a
fever pitch. I can show my work to reasonable people who agree that the
actions taken against me are beyond any credible concerns regarding pro-
tection of the currency. Moreover, it has been said to me that this is a
"pornography" case, and I well understand why, having been told by
representatives of the federal government, on more than one occasion,
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that my work is "sacrilegious," "subversive," "anti-social," and "an at-
tempt to undermine the economic structure of America." (Get reall)
Part of the problem has been generated by the performance element
of my work, "spending" the works of art for their face value. This
caught the attention of a great number of people, including 'the news
media. Newspapers were writing about my work, and articles appeared
describing the fact that I was buying almost everything with these works,
and getting the receipt and change-in legal tender. Needless to say,
some very interesting imagery Was generated in the form of newspaper
photographs of my work."'
Sounds like counterfeiting! Looks like money! Must be illegal!
Never mind any questions or serious investigation, this is an open and
shut case. Or is it?
There are very few people, even in the art-world proper, who under-
stand that the images generated in the media are an intentional extension
of my work. Where in my "transactions" I attempt to bring complex
dialogue to an uninitiated audience by going outside the gallery or mu-
seum and confronting an individual who does not frequent such oases, I
also try to export the images and issues to society through the conduit of
mass media. This is part of the very form itself-late 20th century
American trompe l'oeil.
The kinship that exists between this and past movements employing
the style is very close, having much to do with the perceptual nature of
reality. In particular, the kinship with 19th century American trompe
l'oeil is that both contain a great deal of human response to socio-eco-
nomic and political issues. I could ramble on for pages about the philo-
sophical nature of the form, but there are two germane points I wish to
highlight.
First, the images created and disseminated through the mass media
are primarily mine, but they are produced in collaboration with the me-
dia. When XYZ broadcasts, or Mag-News publishes, a "story" about my
work, they are in fact participating in and helping to create "the" work.
Yet, they own the copyright, because they own the tape or the issue. I
can do little else under current practice, if I want the work to exist.
There is no equivalent of the ASCA. for the visual arts. If I want to
work in this form, I must accept that the work gets "published" in this
fashion, and that there is little to be done to protect my financial inter-
ests. The system has no precedent to understand the nature of this form,
and in the absence of standard practice, if I asked for compensation, it
would not be forthcoming.
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Second, although I understand the confusion that will surround the
creation of a new and unique form of expression, the confusion of trompe
l'oeil is at the heart of its power to clarify the conceptual understanding
of the world around us. Translated from French, trompe l'oeil means
"trick of the eye." This is not the same as trick of the mind, which is the
foundation of fraud. Trickery is in play in all this, but it is employed
with care. The fact that escapes the authorities is that everyone knew the
pictures were works of art. No one was fooled into believing these "pic-
tures" were actual currency. Rather, people accepted them, at the very
"face-value" portrayed on each bill, as an act of appreciation for, and (to
some degree, I hope) understanding of, the work itself.
Freedom of speech, as protected under the First Amendment, ex-
tends only so far. The example of "yelling 'Fire!' in a crowded theater" is
a case in point. But to my knowledge, this does not extend to the play-
wright's script nor the enthusiastic vocal performance of the word by
actors and actresses, on stage or off] If reasonable people can discern that
it is part of the performance, no matter how successful the suspension-of-
disbelief may be (which is, after all, a great part of the point in art), then
this is a protected expression.
Fire marshals, of course, do have some say over the extent of use of
actual fire on the stage, and the means which must be immediately avail-
able to deal with any unforeseen lack of containment. But, to the credit
of almost every fire department in the world, theater companies routinely
are given exemptions from local fire codes. This is not done as a matter
of free speech nor constitutional right. It is based on a very ingrained
appreciation for the delights of theater. Unfortunately, the visual arts
have not fared as well in societies born of the English aesthetic, where
literature is the supreme form of expression.
If you think about it, in theater even consumption of the auditory
sensation is predominantly based on the written word. Even music sus-
tains its economic validity from a theatrical supporting role (very few
musical works make it to the top ten if they have no vocal track). Visual
communication has historically been relied on as a matter of "fact" as
opposed to "expression."
"Baloney!" as my Grand-Mom Irene used to say. And she wasn't
talking about lunch meat, or she would have said, "Bologna." You say
"toml'to," and I say "tomdto," .and with that, Frank Sinatra hit the
counter-point nail on the head. There is inflection beyond the written
word, which, although having the same meaning---or nott-leads us to
understanding. If you base all of your conclusions on mere visual resem-
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blance, the English are eating some round red vegetable which does not
exist in American society, and we could end world hunger by printing
the word-food.
fooD Fop T4oUCAfT
All these problems exist in the visual, as well as all other sensory
experience. If you are going to make judgments based on a simplistic,
single perspective viewpoint, then you are never going to see the full pic-
ture, and by extension, your conception will always be misinformed.
I understand that you, the reader, are more than likely a student of
law. And I make this appeal-the world is enduring yet another revolu-
tion. Precedent is only a good thing if it is still able to accommodate the
reality of the changing paradigm. If it fails to do that, then it has failed
altogether. The world is not flat, no matter how many books or maps
exist in support of the concept. This is not to say that you throw the
maps out. You just have to wrap them around a more complex struc-
ture-a sphere, instead of a plane.
When rap artists started making "scratch" (excuse the pun), using
turntables and records as musical instruments-Wow/ That was creativ-
ity. But when the owners of the copyright in the little bits of samplings
the rappers employed started suing for royalties-the cry was "Same o'
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same o'." In the visual arts, neglected as they are by the flow of eco-
nomic support, collage never attracted such bean-vision.
When is something a creation, as opposed to a discovery? What is
the true motive of securing property? When does the creation of "owner-
ship" occur? When is value an issue at all? When money is made.
All the senses, as well as emotions, lead back to what we attempt to
refer to as "intellectual property." But above all, this has more to do
with the right of exploitation and the protection of productivity. It
doesn't really matter, particularly in this brief moment in history,
whether the materials employed are synthetic or organic, physical or in-
tangible, created or discovered, or even "functional" in any sense of the
word. The important point is ascertaining who contributed what to that
which enhances our understanding and appreciation, and hence the qual-
ity, of life. This is a big job, if ever there was one, and all the more
difficult under the burden of ensuring that still more wealth created or
value-added isn't unduly restricted!
In response to the U.S. Attorney's threatening letter, I created a new
work-"The Magic Money Machine." Though I was to use an actual
color laser copier on stage, both Canon and Xerox backed out at the last
minute, fearing confiscation of their very expensive machines. One of
them did make available an advanced model capable of actual counter-
feiting. I placed a genuine U.S. $100 Federal Reserve Note into the
machine and began printing. What I produced on that machine came
out of "The Magic Money Machine" (which I had constructed from bits
and pieces in my studio) the following night.
I had announced, including to the Secret Service, my intention to
color photocopy a genuine $100 bill, and that the finale would be sub-
titled "The Perfect Counterfeit!" Photocopies of the $100 bill poured
forth. The first were digitized beyond recognition. The next were per-
fectly recognizable, though somewhat rearranged, like a child's square
block puzzle. Then followed whole bills, with a coherent image, in the
correct size, in color: red, pink, purple, blue, yellow, orange, and even
green . . . lime green/ (yech!). Where someone else may have merely
copied the bill, I had made interpretations containing obvious, visually
expressive statements.
To take things a step farther, I produced a two-sided $100 bill work
of art in the correct color, size, shape, image and image quality appropri-
ately entitled "The Perfect Counterfeit!" The right of first option to
purchase this work was promptly put at auction. Though it was perfect
in every detail, without discernable visual difference from the $100 bill I
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had used to create it, I had not copied a $100 bill. I had created a work
of art that contained something new and in addition to the bill. There is
a difference. And I wasn't the only one who could see the addition. The
hammer fell at $275.
I work very hard, and I think it is only fair that, when society gains
some benefit from that productivity, I should be supported in my efforts.
But the creative response is not a job. I don't (can't) do commissions. I
can't make myself respond to someone else's specifications. My work
just happens. It is no good for the law to demand that people be human
according to the law if the law is not based on human activity. Things
change, in part because we change them. Sometimes it's not the things
themselves we change, but the way we see them. This is as good as
change.
Art sometimes attempts this through approach. If you want to un-
derstand a thing through total conception, you have to understand the
back of the thing. Since you can't see through the thing, you approach it
from the rear. You walk around it. You turn it upside down. You view
it in different lights. This is as true for the conceptual as it is for the
physical. The law could well use a little re-examination. Everything else
in the world is undergoing this evolutionary process. Who knows, there
might just be a great deal of new intellectual property created. Perhaps,
there will even be enough to answer the question I have about this Essay.
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